The Transatlantic Financial Markets Dialogue led by the SEC and the European Commission has achieved some notable successes, particularly with respect to the consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates and the development of a plan to achieve convergence in corporate financial reporting. On both sides of the Atlantic there is a clear ongoing commitment to the Dialogue as a key mechanism for the development of efficient and credible regulatory solutions that guarantee effective investor protection and a high level of business efficiency. This paper reports on a two-day roundtable discussion that took place at Cambridge University, UK, in September 2005 to explore ways in which the academic community can contribute to this transatlantic debate. Lively discussion between the policymakers, regulators, market participants and academics who attended the roundtable yielded a number of thematic concerns, which, the paper suggests, could form the basis of a programme for further work. Finally, the paper announces the establishment of a seminar series, to be based in the UK, on the Transatlantic Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue and invites contributions.
Product innovations
Accompanying this intense pace of market developments has been the growth of new products and financing techniques, including an explosion in hedge funds and other innovative investment vehicles. The EU, in particular, has seen a dramatic change in its financial landscape with a deeper demand for market-based investments, the emergence of a population of sophisticated institutional investors, a deepening of liquidity, and an expansion in the range of product and financing techniques. In response to these developments, the EU adopted and is now close to concluding the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), 4 a major effort to upgrade its regulatory framework for a more integrated and more heavily regulated European financial market.
Challenges of financial scandals
While the transatlantic financial markets have become deeper and more inter-connected, 
Institutional innovations
This period of rapid change has also seen major institutional innovation, with the arrival of important new supervisory and regulatory bodies, internationally, regionally, and domestically, provoking allied questions as to the effectiveness of institutional governance. In the U.S., important institutional developments include the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and more aggressive Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and stock exchange oversight of corporate 4 Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan COM (1999) 232 (the FSAP).
governance. Internationally, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is now a key standard-setter for financial markets worldwide. In the EU, a new law-making process for securities markets has been developed under the Lamfalussy process for delegated securities law-making: the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) which advises the Commission on legislation has emerged as a key influence on policy development and on the evolving pan-EU supervisory structure. The Lamfalussy structures have now been extended to the banking, insurance, asset management, and pension sectors and are increasingly playing an important role in EU financial market supervision.
Retail participation in capital markets
The role of retail investors in the capital markets is changing. 5 This development is most pronounced in the segmented European capital markets where direct individual participation in capital markets has traditionally been less substantial than in the United
States. 6 On both sides of the Atlantic, changes in public pension policy have been one reason for greater retail participation in capital markets. The reduction of public pension programmes in many European jurisdictions, along with proposals to privatise social welfare provision at least to some degree, has prompted regulatory officials to consider the need for enhanced consumer protections and financial literacy programmes. 7 The extent to which cross-border transactions should be regulated with an eye towards replicating protections designed for retail investors in domestic markets is a matter of continuing debate in policy circles. So too is the very notion of investor protection:
investor protection in a liberalised international marketplace could be argued to depend on the promotion of effective diversification practices which might suggest that regulators should facilitate access to foreign investments even at the cost of some lessening of the degree of protection provided or at least non-uniformity in the mechanisms of investor protection.
II The Establishment of a New Network to Contribute to Transatlantic Dialogue on

Financial Markets
The Move Towards Dialogue
The global economic significance of capital markets and their intensifying interdependence have led U.S. and EU policymakers to recognise the need for structured dialogue and cooperation with a view to ensuring efficient and credible solutions that guarantee effective investor protection and a high level of business efficiency. The U.S.
EU Financial Markets Dialogue between the SEC and the European Commission, which
is bolstered by the formal contacts that are also maintained between CESR and the SEC and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), aims to promote better mutual understanding of regulatory approaches, address potential conflicts from regulatory overspill, and consider regulatory issues of common interest. It has achieved some notable successes, particularly with respect to the consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates 8 and with the development of a plan to achieve convergence in corporate financial reporting. 9 A commitment to dialogue is also evident in the Ibid, 556. for the public to comprehend and hold their own officials accountable. The intensity of accountability concerns is likely to be correlated to the range of matters achieved through a dialogic mechanism: self-evidently, a purely information-sharing dialogue is much less troubling than a dialogue that plays a normative role. 16 Given the risks and costs of financial regulation, particularly with the increased sophistication of market actors, a necessary minimum prerequisite for optimal regulation is that it emerges from an effective governance framework. A particular risk is that the growing community of national, regional, and international standard setters, subject to varying degrees of accountability, may create an unhealthy bias in favour of regulatory solutions to transatlantic issues. Academic input can act as a corrective.
Thirdly, the new emphasis on dialogue in financial services regulation is part of a broader trend away from command-and-control systems to more cooperative approaches, a trend which is driven by the globalisation of the policy process. 
III Seminar organisation
The seminar brought together U.S. and EU academic experts on the regulation of The aim of the meeting was to shape and inform a research agenda, to develop contacts between academics, regulators and financial market participants, and to explore mechanisms whereby academic discourse could best contribute to the broader transatlantic regulatory dialogue. With that in mind, the discussion was organised around a series of topics, on which background papers and short position papers were circulated in advance. In keeping with the agenda-forming nature of the event, participants were 20 Herbert Smith LLP in association with Gleiss Lutz and Stibbe.
not expected to produce fully developed research papers. 21 The topics were: differences and similarities in U.S. and EU regulatory structures; transnational integration (embracing multinational offerings and prospectuses; cross-listing; delisting); trading screens and clearing and settlement; auditing and accounting governance and regulation; credit rating agencies; supervisory cooperation (embracing home and host country regulation; mutual recognition); and hedge funds.
IV Summary of deliberations
A number of key themes emerged from the discussion. It also became clear that these overarching themes were common to discrete areas of financial market regulation which raise very particular problems in the transatlantic context, including financial reporting, financial conglomerates, credit rating agencies, and hedge funds.
Transatlantic regulatory dialogue proceeds from the premise that, as financial markets become more interconnected and market participants increasingly operate on a global scale, regulatory problems can no longer be solved on a national or even regional basis.
In order to prevent problems from simply re-emerging elsewhere, financial regulators must necessarily take a global view. The interdependent nature of regulation and markets is fundamental to any assessment of the regulatory environment.
But when local authorities all start taking a global view, questions of coordination and cooperation take centre stage. Global solutions can be vulnerable to divergent enforcement and implementation. Close attention must therefore be given to mutual recognition and equivalence devices and the way in which they are implemented in 21 However, some of the papers considered at the seminar have since been further developed and have appeared as working papers (see, e.g., H. Finally, as regulators and policymakers adopt devices and processes to establish mutual recognition and equivalence standards, they should also be aware of the governance structures in which they operate and the principles upon which these structures are based.
Political scientists have defined governance as the establishment and operation of a set of rules of conduct that define practices, assign roles, and guide interaction in order to address collective action problems. The Sarbanes-Oxley reforms are a good example of a regulatory initiative that was intended to address issues that transcend national boundaries. Ethiopis Tafara (SEC), a seminar participant, has commented in a jointly-written paper on the interest, concern, and debate that Sarbanes-Oxley has generated outside the United States: "When the SEC was created, no one could have imagined that revisions to the U.S. securities laws could 10/4197214_1
13 have such an impact abroad."
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According to Tafara and his co-author, "the SEC recognizes that its rules applicable to non-U.S. market participants must be implemented in a reasonable and measured way that fosters cooperation and consensus building … Our willingness to address foreign concerns is a testament to the importance that we place on open dialogue and to the strong relationships we have with our non-U.S. counterparts."
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The SEC has undoubtedly made significant efforts to accommodate the legitimate concerns of foreign firms about the way in which Sarbanes-Oxley applies to them.
However, the discussion at the seminar confirmed that some sticking points about the impact of US regulatory requirements on foreign issuers still remain. The fact that delisting does not terminate an issuer's reporting requirements as long as the issuer has still at least three hundred US shareholders is a particular target for criticism. 27 In an address at the seminar, Schaub referred to the US position as the "Hotel California has not yet made a decision.
Whether local laws should apply to foreign entities and the problems of regulatory duplication or incompatibility that may arise where they do so apply are issues of concern not only to corporate issuers but also in relation to many other facets of the financial services industry. For example, the application of exchange regulation under the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has sparked controversy when European trading platforms have attempted to locate remote screens in the United States. Discussion at the seminar indicated that this specific issue may be fading in significance as new trends and initiatives provide alternative mechanisms for US investors to access foreign securities markets. However, market ingenuity in the facilitation of investor access to foreign markets does not remove the underlying concern of national regulators in ensuring that their investors are adequately protected and may instead merely shift the focal points within the financial services industry around which such concerns converge. As Jackson,
Gurevich and Fleckner noted in a paper included in the seminar documentation, "the real question for the SEC is not whether it should maintain its hard line with respect to remote trading screens, but rather how it should protect investors in a world in which cross border investment is becoming increasingly commonplace." 31 In the near future, similar issues to those considered in relation to trading screens may arise with respect to the application of U.S. clearing and settlement requirements to foreign clearing agencies. 
Governance issues
Governance has been described as the process and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and constrain the collective activities of groups. 43 The principles that underlie any governance structure can be analysed within the principal-agent framework. 44 These principles can be summarised as effectiveness in the way decisions are reached, the accountability -procedurally and substantively -of the decision-makers to those who are subject to the decisions, and the legitimacy of the decision-making process in a broader social and political sense, in which those who are subject to the decisions accept the governance structure as legitimate.
A plethora of international financial standard-setting bodies exist and can be assessed in regard to whether their decision-making processes and institutional structures are compatible with principles of good governance. The Cambridge seminar discussed in particular the role of the IASB headquartered in London. The IASB now exerts the dominant influence on the content of financial reporting by EU issuers, and has become a 48 As part of the review, the IASB undertook an internal review of its own operating procedures and considered related issues of due process that led to a number of proposals to enhance the transparency of the IASB standard setting process. Some of the proposals included improved accessibility and transparency of the IASB deliberative process, improved IASB responsiveness to constituents' comments, and extending consultation to include more stakeholder groups before announcing proposals and standards.
In addition, the IASC has agreed to a number of reforms including an expansion of the membership of its Board of Trustees to include members from Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. concern and should continue to be closely scrutinised by public and private sector bodies.
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Governance concerns arise across the international regulatory environment and were a recurring theme of the meeting. The growing influence of CESR in pan-EU supervision, in international regulatory dialogue, and in the development of new regulatory solutions to emerging problems (with respect to hedge funds and CRAs, for example) raises governance risks, particularly with respect to accountability. So does the influence of IOSCO in these areas 51 given that IOSCO is increasingly becoming the forum of choice for powerful market actors to influence the international policy debate, raising concerns as to the governance risks of what have been termed "closed policy networks.".
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V Programme for further work
With the Dialogue mechanism now in place, a number of questions require further consideration in light, in particular, of the thematic concerns which emerged at the first meeting.
Promoting regulatory co-ordination
An overarching and recurring issue in the EU-U.S. financial services dialogue concerns the extraterritorial application of local laws. The standard solution to extra-territorial application of financial regulations is an exemption from host-country requirements for foreign entities subject to acceptable regulatory oversight in their home jurisdiction. The requirements, to what extent should host country regulators concern themselves with the governance structure of these standard setting bodies in foreign jurisdictions?
Promoting "better regulation"
It is essential that solutions to international problems and the development of best practice domestically in light of experience in other jurisdictions be evidence-based.
Regulators increasingly accept the importance of cost-benefit analysis domestically (it has long formed part of the U.S. regulatory process and also has been implemented with some rigour by the UK's Financial Services Authority (FSA)) while in the EU the Commission has recently embraced cost-benefit analysis of the FSAP, albeit ex post facto.
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The impact of regulatory overspill on transatlantic market integration, and particularly capital-raising by EU issuers, now has an evidence-based context with the recent delisting and de-registration movement by EU issuers from the US post SarbanesOxley. Similarly, the extent of (and the drivers for) cross-listings is now clearer and can be channelled into policy development with respect to exchange regulation. 
Examining regulatory intensity
Comparing bilateral dialogues and larger, international structures
Bermann, Herdegen and Lindseth have suggested that "one of the challenges facing transatlantic leaders is that of strengthening the transatlantic network without deepening the conditions leading to the exclusion from global governance of other regions of the world". 54 In the same volume, Mavroidis comments that "the political will to deepen transatlantic cooperation" raises questions about multilateral perspectives. (
ii)Financial Conglomerates
The Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates has defined financial conglomerates as heterogeneous bodies ". . . whose primary business is financial, whose regulated entities engage to a significant extent in at least two of the activities of banking, insurance and securities business, and which are not subject to uniform capital adequacy requirements". 59 The increasing size and scope of financial conglomerates is the result of growing consolidation in the financial services industry. 60 The distinguishing factor in the recent wave of financial consolidation in Europe and the US has been that In contrast, a cross-border consolidation involves a merger or acquisition between the same type of financial institutions (e.g., two banks) but which operate in two or more countries. 62 on the concepts of "banking" and "commerce". 65 In contrast, the European approach focuses on the distinction between "banking" and "investment". Moreover, the European countries have relatively relaxed regulations on ownership and participation of commercial banks in non financial firms, and allow a combination of banking and investment. However, this participation is not totally unrestricted. All EU countries abide by the Banking Directive 2000/12EC, 66 which imposes some restrictions in this area.
Moreover, some EU states (e.g., the UK) have additional regulations in place, such as authorisation procedures, but the European approach generally is more liberal than that of the U.S..
A concern which often arises is which type of consolidation is preferred and fostered by a The Forum has released a set of documents dealing with financial supervision and consolidation. As such, the need for conglomerate-specific supervision has been recognised. 68 However, the effective supervision of conglomerates will require ongoing coordination and cooperation between European and U.S. regulators. In the transatlantic dialogue, academics can play an important role by helping to assess broader trends in financial markets and the role of regulation in minimizing the social costs of financial risk-taking and what this means for accommodating firm practices with market realities and societal needs.
Issues on the horizon
Inevitably, any financial markets dialogue is dynamic and the agenda expands with Once major U.S. and European exchanges are under common control, the possibility of a truly integrated transatlantic capital market will be one step closer. However, the full consolidation of trading markets on both sides of the Atlantic will also pose a number of difficult regulatory challenges, a number of which will be difficult to address until the convergence of corporate financial reporting standards has been achieve. At that point, however, the prospects for a much more fully integrated transatlantic market may in fact be realized.
(8) Considering the purposes of regulation in an evolving international context
67 The Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates established in 1996 by the Basel Committee, IOSCO and IAIS. 68 In particular, three documents set important principles in the field: the "Capital Adequacy Principles Paper", the "Fit and Proper Principles", and the "Principles for Supervisory Information Sharing".
Finally, the effectiveness of this work agenda ultimately depends on productive discussion of the purposes of regulation in an evolving international context. In the absence of a secure understanding of the purposes of regulation it becomes difficult, for example, to assess supervisory intensity, develop mutual recognition and equivalence mechanisms, or consider which agency or forum is best placed to take forward a particular problem.
Particular issues arise concerning investor protection, arguably the fundamental concern for the world's financial market regulators and often used as cover for political and national interests. Should regulators place investor protection more fully in the international context and embrace diversification as an aspect of investor protection?
Should the international response to hedge funds, for example, regard wider range, sophisticated investments as an opportunity and not just a risk for investors? As a paper Understanding the purpose of regulation can also throw light on otherwise problematic measures. As James Palmer (a participant in the seminar, partner of Herbert Smith)
commented, the EU's Prospectus Directive, 71 which establishes an extensive disclosure regime for retail offers, may not be a success in promoting pan-EU capital-raising. But it can also be regarded as an exercise in "regulation as marketing," designed to promote a retail equity culture through the establishment of a retail-oriented disclosure regime for public offers. How, therefore, can attempts to promote retail activity internationally as governments withdraw from social welfare, education, and pension provision, be designed to avoid damaging wholesale markets and efficient capital-raising?
VI Conclusion
This paper suggests more questions than answers. This is appropriate as it is the product of an initiative that was designed initially to establish a research agenda. The next stage -to take forward the work programme that has emerged from the deliberations at the Cambridge seminar -is rather daunting but fascinating. Much is at stake because suboptimal financial services regulatory policy decisions have the capacity to generate significant costs for suppliers and consumers of financial services and to undermine competition. When he appeared before the Committee on Financial Services of the U.S.
House of Representatives in May 2004
, Alexander Schaub said the structured dialogue between the SEC and the European Commission needed to be with the full support and involvement of industry, businesses and end-users: it was not enough for the bureaucrats and regulators to talk and resolve issues together as they had to communicate more effectively, and ensure that they were resolving the right issues.
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The Cambridge seminar confirmed that academics too can play a role in helping to find regulatory solutions that will withstand global scrutiny and work effectively. A series of seminars on issues related to the Transatlantic Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue is planned for 2006/7. This seminar series will be based in the UK. Persons who would be interested in presenting a paper or in attending as a discussant are invited to contact Eilís Ferran, one of the authors of this paper.
